I am beginning to get confused. (Maybe I should just read the book.) Is Bohm specifically setting out to make an untestable claim with his description of an "implicate order," or is he trying to clear up problems of a scientific nature? Up until you presented the part about energies and suchlike (which unfortunately I lack the physics background to evaluate), I thought he was making a purely unfalsifiable conjecture about the metaphysical nature of the universe.
Actually, what worries me is not which type of claim he is making, but that he seems to be mixing the two together and deriving physical claims from metaphysical articles of faith. To me, the most salient feature of an "implicate order" such as he describes in the first three passages is its total inaccessibility to the observer. The problem is not just an empirical difficulty in observing the obscure levels of organization. It's a theoretical impossibility to ever know to what extent what you've seen of "explicate" reality is representative of reality at it's deepest, most "implicate" level. The epistemic barrier between explicate and implicate is by definition uncrossable. One can extend this principle - as I do - to a general mistrust of any supposed language about the "implicate." As someone once told me: you can't eff the ineffable.
![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png)
timeasmymeasure
no subject
Date: 2004-08-03 11:46 am (UTC)Actually, what worries me is not which type of claim he is making, but that he seems to be mixing the two together and deriving physical claims from metaphysical articles of faith. To me, the most salient feature of an "implicate order" such as he describes in the first three passages is its total inaccessibility to the observer. The problem is not just an empirical difficulty in observing the obscure levels of organization. It's a theoretical impossibility to ever know to what extent what you've seen of "explicate" reality is representative of reality at it's deepest, most "implicate" level. The epistemic barrier between explicate and implicate is by definition uncrossable. One can extend this principle - as I do - to a general mistrust of any supposed language about the "implicate." As someone once told me: you can't eff the ineffable.