![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
Two astonishing hypotheses
Jul. 22nd, 2004 04:43 pmBlackmore concludes The Meme Machine with the suggestion that the "Self," our sense of "I" as an individual, is a memetic illusion. I agree with her that there appear to be memes wrapped up tightly with individual identity, but I disagree with her conclusion that the self itself is a meme-induced illusion.
She begins by laying out the observations which were central to Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness as presented in Consciousness Explained. Dennett began his position by comparing first-person experience to a "Cartesian Theater." That is, there appears to be a "little me" or "real self" inside my head, sitting in a theater watching reality being presented on a screen. This "real self," or "soul," appears to be distinguishable from my body (and could presumably exist without it), makes every decision, and controls my body as if she is driving a gundam.
This interpretation of reality is false, Dennett says, because there is no neural correlate to the self. That is, there is no central chamber in the brain through which all input is channelled. The brain is a marvel of parallel processing; when we see an object and reach out to grab it, many separate parts of our brain are involved simultaneously.
Instead, my brain appears to be actively constructing a story or narrative with a fictitious central character, "me." This narrative lags behind reality by as much as half a second, a result which has been confirmed in various neurological experiments. We do not notice the lag because the narrative is edited to ensure that the "time signatures" of messages from different parts of the brain appear to be in sync.
This narrative can also differ from reality, as demonstrated in numerous experiments.
The evidence as presented by Dennett is very impressive. Dennett, however, cannot explain how such an illusion would come about -- what evolutionary benefit would be conferred by expending oxygen on the development of a reality narrative -- or why it should be so very convincing and enduring.
Blackmore explains that the sense of self would be of great benefit to the memes. A meme that we consider to be connected to our identity or sense of self is one which we are going to be more likely to defend or promote; therefore memes bundled with self-identity have a greater chance of survival and replication.
This is an excellent point -- and while it might explain what evolutionary pressure might encourage the "self illusion" (or selfplex as she calls it), but she leaves unanswered how a meme could accomplish what Dennett claims the brain itself cannot. IOW, if there is no "central processing unit" in the brain, it is unclear how a meme would simulate one. Also absent is any explanation of why, if the self were a memetic illusion, language is inadequate for describing conscious experience.
Of course, what Dennett and Blackmore, and other eliminative materialists like Patricia Churchland and William Calvin, are looking for and not finding is a neurological structure responsible for consciousness. The prospect that consciousness could exist on a different level is unaccountably dismissed. Other such levels include:
Of these alternatives, the most promising is the idea of quantum consciousness, which I personally find to be the most convincing. It is speculative, but then, any theory of consciousness is speculative at this point.
That there exists a relationship between consciousness and events on the quantum level is well-known. How precisely that relationship works is understood only very tenuously. Physicist David Bohm favors viewing reality -- observer, observed, and act of observation -- as an implicate and undivided wholeness, only appearing to be fragmented to our cognitive and perceptual faculties. That is, fragmentation is a useful cognitive strategy, but it is inaccurate to extrapolate from that usefulness a worldview of existence as fragmented.
Quantum events are known to be non-locally interconnected, and it is known that the act of perception has an effect on the outcome of quantum events. If there is quantum activity going on within the brain, then it stands to reason that perception of brain events should affect their outcome.
This in fact has been found to be the case.
Jeffrey Schwartz described startling results, and an even more startling hypothesis, in his book The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force. Schwartz found that use of Buddhist meditative techniques in patients with OCD successfully reduced the occurrence of OCD symptoms and, according to fMRI results, actually "rewired" the brains of many of his patients. The key to success was steady conscious focus -- essentially delivering hard proof that conscious focus makes it possible to guide neuroplasticity.
She begins by laying out the observations which were central to Daniel Dennett's theory of consciousness as presented in Consciousness Explained. Dennett began his position by comparing first-person experience to a "Cartesian Theater." That is, there appears to be a "little me" or "real self" inside my head, sitting in a theater watching reality being presented on a screen. This "real self," or "soul," appears to be distinguishable from my body (and could presumably exist without it), makes every decision, and controls my body as if she is driving a gundam.
This interpretation of reality is false, Dennett says, because there is no neural correlate to the self. That is, there is no central chamber in the brain through which all input is channelled. The brain is a marvel of parallel processing; when we see an object and reach out to grab it, many separate parts of our brain are involved simultaneously.
Instead, my brain appears to be actively constructing a story or narrative with a fictitious central character, "me." This narrative lags behind reality by as much as half a second, a result which has been confirmed in various neurological experiments. We do not notice the lag because the narrative is edited to ensure that the "time signatures" of messages from different parts of the brain appear to be in sync.
This narrative can also differ from reality, as demonstrated in numerous experiments.
The evidence as presented by Dennett is very impressive. Dennett, however, cannot explain how such an illusion would come about -- what evolutionary benefit would be conferred by expending oxygen on the development of a reality narrative -- or why it should be so very convincing and enduring.
Blackmore explains that the sense of self would be of great benefit to the memes. A meme that we consider to be connected to our identity or sense of self is one which we are going to be more likely to defend or promote; therefore memes bundled with self-identity have a greater chance of survival and replication.
This is an excellent point -- and while it might explain what evolutionary pressure might encourage the "self illusion" (or selfplex as she calls it), but she leaves unanswered how a meme could accomplish what Dennett claims the brain itself cannot. IOW, if there is no "central processing unit" in the brain, it is unclear how a meme would simulate one. Also absent is any explanation of why, if the self were a memetic illusion, language is inadequate for describing conscious experience.
Of course, what Dennett and Blackmore, and other eliminative materialists like Patricia Churchland and William Calvin, are looking for and not finding is a neurological structure responsible for consciousness. The prospect that consciousness could exist on a different level is unaccountably dismissed. Other such levels include:
- Consciousness as a property that develops whenever certain complex patterns of perception and/or cognition occur ("Strong AI")
- Consciousness as caused by, or correlated with, quantum-level activity (for example the theory of "Orchestrated Objective Reduction" proposed by Penrose and Hameroff)
- Consciousness as an inherent property of existence (panpsychism)
Of these alternatives, the most promising is the idea of quantum consciousness, which I personally find to be the most convincing. It is speculative, but then, any theory of consciousness is speculative at this point.
That there exists a relationship between consciousness and events on the quantum level is well-known. How precisely that relationship works is understood only very tenuously. Physicist David Bohm favors viewing reality -- observer, observed, and act of observation -- as an implicate and undivided wholeness, only appearing to be fragmented to our cognitive and perceptual faculties. That is, fragmentation is a useful cognitive strategy, but it is inaccurate to extrapolate from that usefulness a worldview of existence as fragmented.
Quantum events are known to be non-locally interconnected, and it is known that the act of perception has an effect on the outcome of quantum events. If there is quantum activity going on within the brain, then it stands to reason that perception of brain events should affect their outcome.
This in fact has been found to be the case.
Jeffrey Schwartz described startling results, and an even more startling hypothesis, in his book The Mind and the Brain: Neuroplasticity and the Power of Mental Force. Schwartz found that use of Buddhist meditative techniques in patients with OCD successfully reduced the occurrence of OCD symptoms and, according to fMRI results, actually "rewired" the brains of many of his patients. The key to success was steady conscious focus -- essentially delivering hard proof that conscious focus makes it possible to guide neuroplasticity.
